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Abstract. Scientific researchers welcome disagreement as a way of furthering epistemic aims. 
Religious communities, by contrast, tend to regard it as a potential threat to their beliefs. But I argue 
that religious disagreement can help achieve religious epistemic aims. I do not argue this by 
comparing science and religion, however. For scientific hypotheses are ideally held with a scholarly 
neutrality, and my aim is to persuade those who are committed to religious beliefs that religious 
disagreement can be epistemically beneficial for them too. 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Scientific researchers welcome disagreement as a source of epistemic benefit.i Religious 
communities, by contrast, tend to regard religious disagreement either within or outside their 
religious community as a threat to their beliefs, and hence to discourage it. This defensive reaction 
makes psychological sense: a religious community’s beliefs are intimately linked with its values and 
form of life. When on top of this religious believers take their belief system to be a divine gift, it 
makes sense that they would feel obligated to protect it. But I will argue that this defensive attitude 
is epistemically counterproductive. When people with a variety of experiences and background 
assumptions engage in religious disagreement instead of suppressing it, each party stands to learn 
something. 
I will defend the following thesis: 
 
The Epistemic-Potential Claim: Religious disagreement has the strong potential to promote 
epistemic goals in the religious domain, to a greater extent than suppressing it does.  
 
The epistemic-potential claim may be happily endorsed by those who regard religious beliefs as 
relevantly similar to scientific hypotheses (or at least a stereotypical understanding of them), that is, 
as objects of dispassionate investigation from a neutral standpoint. But such are not my intended 
audience. I am instead addressing those who, because they deny that religious beliefs are like this, 
take the defensive mentality described above. 
 Committed believers of this ilk will have several reservations about the epistemic-potential 
claim. One is that, if your religious belief system is already largely on target, you will not need any 
benefits that religious disagreement might otherwise provide. Another is that you will not need 
them if your belief system is brought about with divine help (say, with a properly functioning sensus 
divinitatis; Plantinga, 2000, 171). Third, even if you might benefit from religious disagreement, 
discouraging it is still safer, because it can undermine your epistemic commitment to the truths you 
do possess.  
Making my case to this audience requires expanding the discussion in several ways. First, the 
literature tends to focus narrowly on religious beliefs, but this obscures the various and subtler 
epistemic benefits that disagreement can yield for belief systems. Nor will my discussion be limited 
to disagreement between epistemic peers.ii  
I will not attempt to define the notoriously slippery notion of ‘religious’; for present purposes 
our intuitive ability to recognize particular topics as religious will suffice. My discussion aims to 
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apply to any religious belief system that contains truth claims, as opposed to construing its beliefs 
non-cognitively. It also aims to apply to a variety of world religions, but given the breadth of 
religious diversity and the fact that my interlocutors themselves are working within a Judeo-
Christian context, this aim may not be fully achievable. Finally, I am not assuming the truth or the 
falsehood, or the rationality or irrationality, of any religious (or secular) belief system. 
I’ll start with a word about my intended audience. I’ll then present my account of disagreement 
about religious belief systems and defend the epistemic-potential claim. I’ll finish by responding to 
objections.  
 
Religious disagreement and epistemic commitment  
 
The interlocutors I have in mind are committed religious believers who deny the epistemic-potential 
claim. Some might deny that religious disagreement has any positive epistemic value. Others might 
agree that it may have some, but think nonetheless that suppressing it is epistemically safer. Like 
Plantinga, they might reason that, although a ‘heightened awareness of the facts of religious 
pluralism could bring about a reappraisal of one’s religious life, a reawakening, a new or renewed 
and deepened grasp’ of your religious beliefs (2000b, 190), it will usually have the opposite effect: 
‘For many or most exclusivists, I think, an awareness of the enormous variety of human religious 
responses … directly reduces the level of confidence or degrees of belief in the proposition in 
question’ (ibid., 189, italics added; cf. McKim, 2012, 155; Gellman 2000). Moreover, ‘[s]ince degree 
of warrant depends in part on degree of belief’, disagreement ‘can also deprive the exclusivist of the 
knowledge that [his religious beliefs] are true, even if they are true and he believes that they are’ 
(ibid.). 
In defending the epistemic-potential claim, then, I must reassure committed believers not only 
that engaging in religious disagreement stands to deliver epistemic benefits, but also that the risks 
are less grave than one might fear – both on their own and in balance against the risks of not doing 
so. 
 One might worry that my proposal is incoherent: if disagreement is epistemically beneficial, this 
is because of its potential to correct or change your belief system – and readiness to alter your 
belief system seems incompatible with epistemic commitment to it.iii But this objection fails to 
recognize how multifaceted epistemic commitment can be. Belief systems are not monoliths, but 
rather ‘webs’ with numerous elements of graded centrality. We may grant that there are some sorts 
of belief-system revision that epistemic commitment is incompatible with. But it is perfectly 
compatible with others. For example, being strongly committed to your belief system’s central 
components is compatible with discovering that these components do not, after all, epistemically 
necessitate certain other attitudes to which you had been committed on their account. It is also 
compatible with the discovery of new attitudes that you should be committed to in light of them.  
 One might also worry that, in tolerating any epistemic commitment, I am licensing epistemic 
entrenchment, dogmatism, or fundamentalism. These attitudes are characterized by an 
unwillingness to assimilate evidence against one’s view and are both epistemically and socially 
dangerous; religious epistemology must surely strive to eliminate rather than accommodate them. I 
have two responses. One is that these attitudes only accompany the most extreme forms of 
epistemic commitment, so tolerating commitment does not entail tolerating them too. Indeed, 
most of us are epistemically committed, for example to certain ethical beliefs, but this does not 
mean that we would not change them given enough evidence that they are mistaken. Second, my 
intended audience includes the entrenched, dogmatic, and fundamentalist, though is not exhausted 
by them (cf. Dormandy, forthcoming). If I can convince believers of any stripe that religious 
disagreement contains epistemic benefits, then, even if they are only willing to countenance small 
epistemic adjustments, this is far better than nothing.iv Religious disagreement could issue in drastic 
belief revision, but it need not. For the sake of fostering what benefits we can, we must not expect 
interlocutors to cede more, epistemically, than they are prepared to. 
 So although the epistemic-potential claim is inspired by the philosophy of science, I will not be 
assuming that the parties to a religious disagreement take a neutral, scholarly attitude toward their 
belief systems – on the contrary.  
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Religious belief systems and disagreement 
 
A core concern of religious epistemology is epistemically ‘central’ religious beliefs, such as ‘God 
exists’. But this narrow focus ignores the array of other elements of a belief system, including more 
peripheral beliefs and things other than beliefs, that can be fruitfully disagreed over (Dormandy, 
2018b). No wonder, then, that committed believers might be wary of religious disagreement. I will 
thus begin by zooming out to a broader picture of the objects of religious disagreement. At the 
same time, I will lay some cognitive-psychological groundwork for defending the epistemic-potential 
claim. 
 
Religious belief systems and their influences 
 
Religious belief systemsv have four components. The first is religious beliefs themselves. These can 
concern any number of topics, including theological (e.g. where salvation is found) or practical ones 
(e.g. what to eat or drink). They can be highly general (e.g., claiming that a transcendent reality 
exists), less general (e.g., that that reality is or is not personal), or highly specific (e.g., that a given 
healing constitutes a miracle). 
Second, religious beliefs are embedded in a complex of auxiliary beliefs that do not pertain 
directly to religion. These bear epistemic, logical, and psychological relationships to religious beliefs 
(Wynn, 2017, 126). One area that auxiliary beliefs concern is metaphysics: assumptions about God’s 
relation to time, for instance, may affect our understanding of God’s ability to relate to his 
creatures. Another is empirical: beliefs about the nature of the cosmos, for example, have 
historically been taken to follow from certain religious beliefs, forcing the latter to be re-interpreted 
when the former were disproven.  
An important sort of auxiliary belief concerns epistemological matters. These pertain to general 
epistemological methods and principles. They also include more specific beliefs about how these 
principles are realized: how to interpret different forms of evidence about religion, which 
hermeneutic is appropriate for religious scriptures, which religious beliefs are central to the faith 
and which peripheral, which people in the religious community count as experts, and so forth. I will 
be arguing that religious communities' epistemologies should include the epistemological auxiliary 
belief that engaging in religious disagreement can offer important religious insights. 
Third, religious and auxiliary beliefs are formulated by means of concepts (such as God, galut, 
nirvana, and forgiveness); these determine the meaning of the beliefs that they belong to. Whether, 
for example, your notion of goodness presupposes an ethics of justice or of care has wide-reaching 
implications for your beliefs about God’s actions.  
Finally, religious belief systems include values. These are priorities that pick out the things we 
care about, perhaps ranking them alongside other things. It is in response to values that we 
articulate religious beliefs or concepts to begin with: we must care about something in order to 
bother posing and answering questions about it. A religious community’s values also reflect whose 
concerns most matter within the community.  
 Religious belief systems arise from many factors, of which I will highlight three: evidence, 
psychological influences, and social influences. Evidence, as I understand it, consists in your 
representational experiences and your justified beliefs (Conee and Feldman, 2004, 3-4). Evidence is 
a causal but also a normative influence on what you believe. It can help build your concept of a 
thing, and it influences what you value and disvalue. 
 Psychological influences include affective states (such as emotions and desires). These generate 
so-called ‘hot’ biases (e.g., love of sweets generates a bias in favour of chocolate; fear of outsiders 
generates a bias against out-group members; Hogg and Vaughan, 2014, chapter 2). They also 
include cognitive states, which generate so-called ‘cold’ biases, such as preferences for certain 
epistemic values (e.g., simplicity over explanatory breadth; Kahneman, 2011, part II).  
 Social influences include the stereotypes and biases that are prevalent in our community or 
society – say, in the media, in the going forms of humor, and so forth (Fricker, 2007, 30-40; Mills, 
2007, 23-35). They also include groupthink: the tendency to conform our thought patterns to our 
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social group’s (Janis, 1982, chapter 8). 
 Psychological and social factors can influence your reasoning directly, by simply causing you to 
form or maintain a certain belief, concept, or value. They can also do so indirectly, by operating 
through your evidence, particularly your experiential evidence. They influence, first, what you 
attend to or ignore (Chabris and Simons, 2011, chapter 1; Mack and Rock, 1998). Second, they 
influence how you perceive things when you do attend to them; for example, because you love your 
brother, you may perceive people who resemble him as kind (Zeimbekis and Raftopoulos, 2015). 
Third, these factors influence how you evaluate your evidence: for example, whether you draw the 
simple but limited conclusion or the complex but explanatorily broad one, whether you believe the 
testimony of someone from a stereotyped social group, and so forth (Kahneman, 2011, parts II and 
III; Chabris and Simons, 2010, chapter 5; Fricker, 2007, chapter 2). 
 
Religious disagreement  
 
Now that we have an account of religious belief systems and their influences, we can say what it is 
to disagree over them. We can give a standard account of disagreement about a belief, on which 
you and I disagree if one of us believes that p (or a proposition entailing p), and the other suspends 
judgement or believes that not-p (or a proposition entailing that not-p).vi You and I disagree over 
concepts if you take a given concept to refer to one set of things and I to a different set, or if we use 
different concepts to refer to the same set. As for values, you and I disagree weakly if we care about 
different things or prioritize them differently, and we disagree strongly if we disvalue something 
that the other cares about. Finally, we can disagree over evidence: over whether some belief or 
experience counts as evidence, or whether and how much some purported evidence supports a 
belief. What about psychological and social influences? Since these are not representational, they 
lack any content to disagree over. But we might disagree over whether a certain sort of influence is 
operative in a given case, or whether, if so, it is truth-conducive. 
You can benefit from a disagreement, I’ll argue, even if all you know is the bare fact that 
someone disagrees with you. But the benefits are greatest to the extent that you engage in 
disagreement with your interlocutor. This amounts to conversing with her, in a tolerant and 
charitable way, about your respective religious belief systems, focusing particularly (but not only) on 
the ways in which they are incompatible. Tolerance and charity are important because, when a 
belief system matters to a person, the very idea of someone’s disagreeing with it tends to activate 
her emotional and cognitive defence system; an important way to counteract these tendencies for 
the sake of fruitful conversation is to communicate respectfully. And focusing on incompatibilities is 
important, because if well-meaning interlocutors (say, for the sake of tolerance and charity) 
emphasize only their similarities, they may wind up papering over genuine differences and thus 
missing out on the benefits that I discuss below. 
What epistemic benefits are in the offing? This depends on which aspect of a belief system is at 
issue. For religious beliefs and auxiliary beliefs there is truth, justification, reasonableness, high 
probability, and so forth; and sets of them admit of coherence, explanatory power, or 
representativeness. Concepts can be accurate and – if they aim to carve out an aspect of a complex 
phenomenon for the sake of making it tractable or measurable – useful. As for values, if there are 
non-subjective evaluative properties, then values can be accurate too. But if even if not, values also 
influence the aspects of reality that we become conversant in, and can thus be epistemically helpful 
or unhelpful. Epistemic benefits can also accrue to the factors that influence our belief systems. 
Evidence can be true or (if experiential) accurate. Psychological and social influences can be 
conducive to true beliefs, accurate or helpful concepts, and epistemically broadening values 
(Antony, 2016, 175-184; Gigerenzer, et al., 2000). Finally, a belief system as a whole is accurate to 
the extent that its components yield an overall correct picture of religious reality; this less a matter 
of quantity of accurate components, and more one of getting the important ones right. The 
epistemic benefits of religious disagreement can apply along any of these dimensions.  
I’ll now outline some epistemological worries arising about religious belief systems and their 
influences. These worries, I will then argue, can be mitigated by engaging in religious disagreement.  
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Three epistemological worries 
 
Each type of epistemic influence can promote or impede accuracy. Evidence, arguably constitutively, 
is supposed to promote true beliefs. In many cases it does. However, whether it does in a given case 
depends, first, on how good a sampling of reality it is: it is highly unlikely that a given person can 
have all of the epistemically relevant experiences that there are to be had, so it is highly likely that 
everyone is missing out on relevant information. Whether a body of evidence promotes the truth 
depends, second, on whether the psychological and social factors that influence one’s evidence and 
evidence-evaluation are themselves sensitive to the truth; this the content of your individual pieces 
of evidence as well as how representative of reality as a whole your evidence is.  
 And many psychological and social factors are not truth-sensitive. Some are sensitive to other 
considerations, such as survival. For example, we may be wired to believe, of any snake that we 
encounter, that it is poisonous, even if statistically this is highly unlikely. We may also be wired to 
believe that social hierarchies are just even when they are not, because this promotes social 
cohesion (Hundleby, 2016, 241-243). And we are wired to be far more optimistic about our own 
capabilities than the evidence warrants; this arguably ‘motivate[s] us to get out of bed and 
optimistically take up challenges’ (Chabris and Simons, 2011, 126). Even many so-called ‘epistemic 
values’, such as a preference for simplicity over explanatory breadth, are not truth-sensitive as such, 
but are rather a priori preferences reflecting little more than aesthetics or pragmatic needs 
(Solomon, 2001, 16-20; Antony, 2016, 175-178). 
 Other psychological and social influences are sensitive to the truth: think of expert dispositions 
developed from years of training. But even these are highly unlikely to be perfectly responsive to 
the way things are: experts are not immune from error in their domain of expertise. And in many 
cases experts commit certain errors because of their expertise. Given a single set of symptoms, a 
cardiologist may be biased toward cardiological explanations whereas an endocrinologist may 
favour endocrinological ones, whereas the real explanation may be nutritional. So even truth-
sensitive psychological and sociological influences are prone to generating certain sorts of false 
belief even as they promote other true ones; I will follow Dormandy (2018a, 60) in calling a belief 
brought about by an otherwise truth-sensitive influence a false-positive belief. 
 Groupthink is worth special mention. This social influence is not truth-sensitive: whether your 
group believes something is not thereby an indication of its truth. A given case of groupthink is only 
truth-sensitive if the group’s thought patterns are themselves truth-sensitive – as in a group of 
experts. But false-positive beliefs may arise here too. For example, the recorded proportion of 
diagnoses of a given disease in some countries is much larger than in others, when other indicators 
would predict similar proportions. Groupthink in the countries’ respective medical professions is 
arguably a culprit. 
 These three influences on our belief systems (evidence, psychological factors, and social ones) 
are largely implicit: they occur below our fully conscious awareness.vii This holds especially for 
psychological and social influences, some of which are patently unconscious. But even evidence, 
though understood to be available on sufficient reflection (Conee and Feldman, 2007, chapter 4), is 
often implicit: we have too much evidence to reflect on simultaneously or even in sequence, and for 
many questions we never even try (ibid.). Because of this, we are often in the dark about the origin 
and justification of our beliefs, concepts, and values; even cogent reasoning conceals hidden 
influences. Many will not be truth-sensitive. Many others will be, but will nonetheless be fallible 
and even prone to generating false-positive beliefs. And many of the epistemically good and bad 
features of our reasoning will be shared by our community.  
 Three epistemological worries arise from these considerations.viii The circularity worry says that a 
group of like-minded people is in a bad position to epistemically self-evaluate. Group members will 
be strongly disposed to conclude that their belief system is in epistemically good shape whether or 
not it is. One reason is that they will evaluate their belief system by its own standards, which will be 
biased to self-favour. Another reason is that groupthink makes it likely that most members will 
exhibit similar thought patterns and hence be in a bad position to offer independent criticism.  
 Second, what I’ll call the distortion worry says that a group’s belief system is prone to 
misrepresent some aspects of reality. One reason is that perspectives by nature reveal some things 
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but occlude others. Another reason is given by the prevalence of truth-insensitive influences, which 
have a higher probability of distortion than truth-sensitive ones and may compete with them. A 
third is given by the likelihood that even truth-sensitive influences are apt to generate certain false-
positive beliefs. Fourth, the circularity worry itself promotes distortion, for it hinders group 
members in becoming aware of any distortions or risks thereof in their belief systems, leaving them 
apt to build greater distortions upon them.  
 Whereas the circularity and distortion worries apply to reasoning about any topic, the 
exacerbation worry (as I’ll call it) arises specifically with respect to reasoning about existentially and 
personally important issues such as religion. It says that, when such topics are at issue, the 
circularity and distortion worries are exacerbated: we become less adept at critically evaluating our 
own belief systems, and those belief systems are more likely to be subject to distortion. The reason 
is that thinking about these matters activates certain psychological and social defences. Religion 
creates an overall coherent picture of life and our place in it, so that we tend to fear (and thus be 
biased against) anything that may call ours into question (Solomon, et al., 1991). On top of this, a 
person’s religious belief system tends to be tightly linked with his sense of identity. The circularity 
worry is thus worsened, because psychological and social factors are in full gear to promote positive 
evaluations of our own views and negative evaluations of alternatives. The distortion worry is 
worsened because, first, if we are in error, strong psychological and social influences make us more 
likely to stay that way; but second, even if we are largely on track, they will make us more 
susceptible to false-positive beliefs. 
 
The epistemic-potential claim defended 
 
I will now argue that engaging in disagreement can help mitigate these problems. My argument will 
not, for the most part, differentiate between disagreement about religion and about other matters: 
engaging in disagreement is epistemically beneficial in general. The only way in which I will argue 
that religious disagreement can be of particular benefit is in mitigating the exacerbation problem, at 
least when the topic of religion is what caused the exacerbation. The first three benefits address the 
circularity and distortion problems, and the fourth addresses the exacerbation problem.  
 1. Engaging in religious disagreement can provide constructive external criticism of your belief 
system, of a sort that you would be ill equipped to generate alone. A disagreeing outsider is in a 
good position to notice unexamined auxiliary beliefs or concepts that miss important aspects of a 
phenomenon, or to call attention to values that your belief system ignores. External criticism can 
help mitigate the circularity worry by alerting us to aspects of our belief systems that we took for 
granted and thus failed to evaluate, and it can provide a less sympathetic source of evaluation with 
which to triangulate our usually favourable self-evaluations. Granted, we will evaluate others’ 
criticism through the filter of our own belief system, but such criticism nonetheless provides a 
different sort of datum to run through the filter. As for the distortion worry, external criticism can 
provide clues about what our belief system might miss or misconstrue, and in prompting us to 
nuance our belief systems, it can rein in truth-insensitive biases and the false-positive effects of 
truth-sensitive ones. 
 2. Engaging in disagreement can expand your evidential basis. It delivers, first, the evidence that 
someone disagrees with you, which, depending on certain epistemically relevant characteristics of 
your interlocutor (e.g., whether he is an epistemic peer, epistemically or personally admirable, and 
so forthix), might prompt you to re-think some aspects of your belief system. Second, disagreement 
provides you with information about your interlocutor’s evidence, which will likely differ from yours 
in two respects: it will arise from different types of event than you have experienced (since she will 
likely travel in different social and cultural circles than you), and her psychological and social 
influences will prime her to experience some of the same types of event differently than you do. 
Additional evidence of these sorts can help mitigate the circularity worry, for such evidence can be 
harder to accommodate within your belief system than evidence more typical to your community 
members, and hence can challenge facile self-evaluations. It can mitigate the distortion worry by 
offering correctives to incomplete (and thus potentially misleading) evidence of your own. 
 3. Engaging in disagreement can provide epistemic alternatives. In helping you understand your 
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interlocutor’s belief system and patterns of reasoning, it may create new conceptual or epistemic 
possibilities. This can mitigate the circularity worry, since alternatives can present other means of 
epistemic evaluation. And it can mitigate the distortion worry, since new epistemic alternatives can 
complement or improve on aspects of your own belief system or help you understand, by direct 
contrast, why your belief system is epistemically preferable. 
 4. Whereas the first three benefits address the circularity and distortion worries, the fourth 
helps mitigate the exacerbation problem. This problem (to recall) says that reasoning about religion 
strengthens the negative effects of our biases, thus exacerbating the other two worries. 
Disagreement can help here by supplying counterinstances (Saul, 2012, 259). A counterinstance is a 
person or thing that does not correspond with what a bias would lead one to expect; exposure to 
counterinstances can help weaken bias and can improve one’s ability to engage in nuanced and 
differentiated reasoning. For example, if fear of dogs biases us against them, then the more friendly 
dogs we meet, the less we will tend to fear dogs and the more we will assess the dangerousness of 
each dog individually. Similarly, the more intelligent and admirable people we meet among those 
who disagree with us about religion, the more likely these interactions are to de-fuse some of the 
defence mechanisms that close us off to constructive discourse. Of course, if our interactions with 
our interlocutors are adversarial, things could go the other way: our biases may be reinforced and 
our nuanced thinking diminished. But if our discourse is cordial and constructive, engaging in 
disagreement can work against the factors that exacerbate the circularity and distortion worries.   
One might think that these epistemic benefits arise primarily from disagreements between 
epistemic peers;x if so, this would limit my argument (though how much it did so would depend on 
how demanding our notion of peerhood is). For epistemic peers are a mere subset of the people we 
might encounter – on some accounts of peerhood, a vanishingly small one (King, 2012). In response 
to this concern, peerhood bears little relevance to my overall argument. An interlocutor need not 
be a peer to call attention to weak spots in your belief system, including to values that it neglects. 
Nor does her not being a peer undermine the epistemic value of her evidence; indeed, if her 
evidence differs significantly from yours (which many definitions take to exclude peerhood), this 
would be an epistemic advantage, since (as I’ve argued) her evidence can supplement yours. Finally, 
someone need not be a peer in order for aspects of her belief system to open up alternatives that 
are invisible on yours. 
The committed believer might also wonder how the epistemic openness needed for engaging in 
disagreement is compatible with the ‘error theories’ that religious belief systems sometimes deploy 
to explain the disagreement of nonbelievers; think of Plantinga’s claim that non-Christians are 
tainted by the noetic effects of sin (2000a, chapter 7), or Martin’s (1990) claim, in support of 
atheism, that religious beliefs result from wishful thinking (chapter 6). Such error theories can add 
coherence to one’s belief system, and there may be evidence (especially internal to the belief 
system in question) to think them true. But in order to reap the greatest epistemic benefits from 
disagreement, interlocutors must not wield these theories as ‘discrediting mechanisms’ (McKim, 
2001, 136) that excuse us from taking our interlocutor seriously. 
But how can it be epistemically appropriate to maintain an error theory without using it as a 
discrediting mechanism? After all, if you reasonably believe, because of evidence internal to your 
belief system, that sin has noetic outworkings on your interlocutor, epistemic responsibility might 
seem to require discrediting his opinions. We must recognize in response that, first, even if an error 
theory is true, it does not follow that it explains every disagreement you encounter – a given 
disagreement might arise from genuine vulnerabilities in your view. For example, even if atheists 
are prevented from perceiving signs of God in the world, they can and do perceive horrendous evil 
and construct powerful arguments from it. Second, even if your interlocutor’s disagreement is 
explained by (say) the noetic effects of sin, it does not follow that she is not on to something or that 
she has not really spotted a weakness in your view. After all, false beliefs can rest on good evidence 
and true ones on bad evidence. Third, even if your interlocutor’s criticism is mistaken (due to the 
noetic effects of sin or some other cause), engaging in disagreement with her can still yield 
important epistemic benefits. For example, it can show you that your belief system stands to be 
better articulated and supported. 
 Finally, one might object that my argument falters because of the differences in epistemic 
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standards from one religious belief system to another. Recall that religious belief systems include 
auxiliary beliefs about epistemic standards. Unlike science, which relies on intersubjectively 
available evidence and on premises that do not beg the question of one’s interlocutor, there are few 
if any interreligious epistemic standards that two parties disagreeing about religion even could 
employ. Is not the whole endeavor of engaging in religious disagreement doomed from the start? It 
is not. First, one might engage in disagreement within one’s own tradition. Second, and more 
importantly, the fact that there are few tradition-external standards is a major reason for 
epistemically valuing religious disagreement. Comparing and contrasting the deliverances of 
markedly different epistemic standards themselves will help interlocutors take a critical view on 
their own, where such a critical view – precisely because there is no inter-religiously accepted 
method – would otherwise be hard to foster.  
 
The already-accurate objection 
 
The committed believer may grant that the epistemic-potential claim applies to many 
disagreements, but she might deny that it applies to religious disagreement – at least, when the 
religious belief system in question is hers. For her religious belief system, she will say, is mostly 
accurate already. The best way for her religious community to achieve epistemic aims is thus to sit 
tight with its belief system as it has been passed down. Disagreement is not only epistemically 
otiose in her case, but threatens to mislead or confuse. 
But even if her belief system is accurate, sitting tight is not a viable option for the committed 
religious believer. For religious communities exist in times and cultures, and these bring constant 
epistemic challenges and opportunities (Wynn, 2017, 126-127). As history advanced, for example, 
societies developed destructive political ideologies, many of which infiltrated religious belief 
systems. Because of the less than fully conscious way in which epistemic influences work (see 
above), this can catch religious communities unaware. A dissenting outside perspective can help call 
attention to worrying trends like this. Times and cultures also bring new epistemic insights that the 
historical founders of one’s belief system may not have been in a position to appreciate. Think for 
example of human rights, or of scientific developments which – when accepted by religious 
communities – led to a deeper understanding of the relationship between divine and physical 
reality. Disagreement with those outside of your religious community can help you assimilate 
positive developments that ultimately benefit your religious belief system. Even largely accurate 
religious belief systems, then, must guard against infiltration by outside error and watch for positive 
outside developments. Disagreement can help them do both. 
 
The proper-function objection 
 
The committed believer may still deny that the epistemic-potential claim applies to her religious 
belief system. For her belief system (she may say) is powered by divine inspiration, insulating it 
against the malign outside epistemic influences mentioned above and helping it assimilate new 
ones – without needing disagreement.xi 
 I cannot discuss all accounts of divine epistemic inspiration, so I will focus on Plantinga’s 
influential ‘sensus divinitatis’ account (2000a, 171). The sensus divinitatis is a cognitive faculty; it 
resembles a sensory mechanism, but instead of yielding sensory experiences, it yields experiences 
of God’s traces in the world, including accurate intellectual seemings concerning religious matters 
(172-174). These experiences non-inferentially give rise to religious beliefs, including the belief that 
God exists. That not everyone believes in God might seem to refute this view. But Plantinga, as we 
saw, has an explanation: the noetic effects of sin cause everyone’s sensus divinitatis to malfunction 
(203, 212), and the Holy Spirit repairs those of some but not all (278). 
The committed believer may argue that the person with a properly functioning sensus divinitatis 
stands to gain nothing from religious disagreement. First, such a person does not need 
disagreement to reveal whether his belief system has absorbed malign epistemic influences from 
new contexts: the sensus divinitatis will prevent this from occurring to begin with. Second, he does 
not need disagreement to reveal new insights: the sensus divinitatis provides all the inspiration he 
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needs. 
To respond, let us look more closely at the cognitive profile of the believer with a properly 
functioning sensus divinitatis. We may divide his experiences into two (mutually exclusive) subsets. 
The first, which I’ll call SD experiences, are those which his properly functioning sensus divinitatis 
helps bring about. These experiences purport mainly to represent religious aspects of reality and 
can include intellectual seemings. I take it that religious believers also have other experiences, 
without religious content or character, that arise from the usual sensory and intellectual 
mechanisms, and that these mechanisms do not need the help of a properly functioning sensus 
divinitatis to deliver accurate experiences. I will call this second subset mundane experiences. SD 
and mundane experiences provide experiential evidence, which is non-inferential, and on its basis 
beliefs, from which inferences can be drawn. 
With this picture in mind, let’s return to the first of the proper functionalist’s reasons for denying 
that religious disagreement can benefit believers whose sensus divinitatis functions properly: that 
the properly functioning sensus divinitatis keeps out epistemically malign influences. 
To assess this claim, let’s consider each factor that might influence a belief system undergirded 
by a properly functioning sensus divinitatis. I’ll start with evidence, focusing on experiential 
evidence, which I have just subdivided into SD and mundane experiences. 
As for SD experiences, we will grant the objector that, due to their origin in the sensus divinitatis, 
these exert an epistemically good influence. They provide non-inferential bases for many true 
religious beliefs and for at least some true auxiliary beliefs (e.g., about scriptural hermeneutics; 
Plantinga, 2000a, 203-204). Although Plantinga only discusses the way in which the properly 
functioning sensus divinitatis produces religious beliefs, we may grant the objector that this 
mechanism also promotes the formation of useful and accurate religious concepts. SD experiences 
might even shape the believer’s values in a way that yields important religious insights. It is 
conceivable that a person’s SD experiences might be affected by unreliable psychological or social 
influences, but for argument’s sake we will charitably grant the objector that the sensus divinitatis 
prevents this. So far, so good for the proper functionalist. 
But let’s turn to the evidence of mundane experiences. Consider their influence on religious 
beliefs. Mundane experiences are unlikely to have any direct evidential impact on religious beliefs, 
since these beliefs will be based largely on SD experiences. But mundane experiences can still exert 
an indirect evidential influence on religious beliefs: they can influence auxiliary beliefs that lack 
religious content, such as those pertaining to metaphysics, epistemology, or empirical matters. 
Mundane experiences can also influence concepts that are not religious as such, such as those of 
love, justice, or forgiveness. And they can influence the believer’s values; for example, someone 
whose parents emphasized punishment over compassion may grow up valuing justice over mercy. 
Since mundane experiences are not governed by the sensus divinitatis, there is no guarantee that 
they will be accurate. So there is a live possibility, even with a properly functioning sensus 
divinitatis, that inaccuracies will creep into one’s religious belief system indirectly, via mundane 
experiences. This of course is problematic for the proper-functionalist. 
What about psychological and social influences on religious belief systems? Recall that these can 
be direct or indirect, where indirect ones operate through evidence. 
Consider first the direct influence of psychological and social factors. Some may be epistemically 
good. For example, an agent’s religious affections may directly bring about true religious beliefs. But 
direct psychological and social factors can also exert negative influence, for example when the 
stereotypes with which the believer grew up cause him to conceive of nonbelievers as (say) inferior. 
It is hard to see how the sensus divinitatis could shield a religious belief system from epistemically 
malign direct psychological or social influences, since this faculty’s remit is limited to generating 
accurate SD experiences. 
Let’s turn to indirect psychological or social influence. When it comes to SD experiences, it is 
reasonable to suppose that the sensus divinitatis shields them from epistemically undesirable 
influences. But mundane experiences pose a problem for the proper functionalist. Since these 
experiences are not within the remit of the sensus divinitatis, this faculty cannot guarantee that 
their epistemic influence on the believer’s mundane experiences will be good. Once more, 
inaccuracies in one’s belief system are a live possibility. 
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In summary, epistemically malign influences can affect even a belief system that is underwritten 
by a properly functioning sensus divinitatis, by the influence of mundane experiences and indirect 
psychological and social workings on them, and the influence of direct psychological and social 
factors. Since belief systems are interlocking networks, any inaccuracies will likely spread through 
them. And since individuals together engage in groupthink, at least some inaccuracies will likely 
infect the religious community – even a community powered by inspired cognitive functioning. 
The proper functionalist might resist this claim by expanding the remit of the sensus divinitatis 
beyond Plantinga’s account. Rather than claiming that this faculty is responsible only for generating 
accurate experiences of God’s traces in the world, she might construe it as a global faculty that 
regulates all of our cognitive mechanisms. 
  But this ‘global sensus divinitatis’ hypothesis cannot be maintained. It is ad hoc, in at least the 
following three (negative) senses. (a) It is subject to abuse, since there are few constraints on it 
(Boudry, 2013, 6): religious believers might suppose that anyone who disagrees with them must be 
mistaken. (b) It is highly implausible on general background knowledge (Howson and Urbach, 2003, 
157-158). For it predicts the existence of some group of religious believers with generally accurate 
experiences and intellectual seemings, not only on religious topics, but on non-religious ones too. 
Yet this prediction falls flat: no religious group appears to have higher epistemic success rates in 
maths, humanities, science, and so forth. (c) The ‘global sensus divinitatis’ hypothesis is highly 
implausible even given most religious belief systems themselves (McGrew, 2014, 495). Religious 
scriptures and traditions do not tend to teach that believers are generally cognitively superior to 
nonbelievers (and indeed Plantinga’s Calvinist tradition teaches that nonbelievers can be just as 
reliable on non-religious matters as believers; Moroney, 1999, chapter 1). 
Another move for the proper functionalist would be to concede that individual believers might 
be susceptible to epistemically malign influence, but deny that this poses a problem for the religious 
community, let alone one that disagreement would help alleviate. A robust religious doxastic 
practice (Alston, 1991), she might argue, should prevent outside errors from spreading through the 
community. But this response will not do. For there is no reason to think that epistemically malign 
influences will limit themselves to isolated individuals; on the contrary, groupthink phenomena 
typically yield the opposite effect. 
So even when a believer’s sensus divinitatis functions properly, his religious belief system 
remains vulnerable to epistemically undesirable influences that this faculty does not control. 
Disagreement can ameliorate matters. 
Let us now consider, more briefly, the proper functionalist’s second reason for denying that 
disagreement can epistemically benefit a belief system underwritten by a properly functioning 
sensus divinitatis: that this faculty will home in on epistemically desirable features of one’s context 
without the help of disagreement. The objector is right that disagreement is not necessary for 
noticing and appropriating epistemically good developments from outside of one’s belief system, at 
least as long as those developments are compatible with it – though it is unclear how one would 
naturally discover such developments if engaging in disagreement with outsiders is discouraged. 
What about developments that are incompatible with aspects of one’s belief system? There seems 
little other way for a religious believer to appropriate them than to engage in disagreement over 
them. But more importantly, it is not clear what the objector stands to gain by claiming that the 
properly functioning believer does not need recourse to disagreement. If the sensus divinitatis 
equips believers to sense traces of the divine in a starry sky (Plantinga, 2000a, 172), then why not 
trust it to sense them in some interlocutor’s disagreeing viewpoint? 
I conclude that, even if you have a properly functioning sensus divinitatis, epistemic infelicities 
can creep into your religious belief system, and disagreement can help uproot them. Moreover, 
there is good reason to welcome religious disagreement as a source of possible epistemic benefit, 
confident that this faculty will help you see what religiously relevant insights it might yield. 
 
The objection from religious commitment 
 
The objector may grant that divine guidance leaves room for inaccuracy, even on religious matters. 
And she may grant that disagreement can help root it out. But she may still deny that fostering it, as 
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opposed to suppressing it, is the best epistemic move for a religious community.xii The reason is that 
engaging in disagreement may threaten the believer’s commitment to his religious belief system. If 
our only two options are cleaving to a largely accurate if imperfect religious belief system or 
destroying believers’ commitment by striving for perfection, then we should surely pick the first 
option.  
There are two dangers that the objector will highlight. The first is normative. Religious 
disagreement, she will say, is likely to furnish counterevidence that threatens the epistemic status of 
your religious or auxiliary beliefs. Indeed, McKim endorses something like the epistemic-potential 
claim, yet draws from it a pessimistic conclusion about the epistemic status of religious beliefs: 
because much of the evidence provided by disagreement speaks against one’s religious view, 
religious beliefs are unjustified unless held tentatively (2012, 155-156). And tentative belief, the 
objector will note, is not committed belief. So it would seem that engaging in religious disagreement 
will force a choice between the believer’s epistemic status and his epistemic commitment. 
But this worry can be dismissed. The epistemic-potential claim entails nothing about epistemic 
justification or any other kind of epistemic status. It is compatible with an evidentialist view, 
according to which positive epistemic status requires respecting your evidence, or a fideist view, on 
which positive status can tolerate a measure of belief ‘beyond’ your evidence (James, 1921; Bishop, 
2007, 107-112). More than this, even evidentialism need not threaten the epistemic status of 
religious beliefs in light of disagreement. For evidentialism is a general claim, and there are many 
ways in which it can be spelled out (Dougherty, 2014, 101). For example, the evidentialist 
epistemologies of Plantinga (2000a) and Dougherty (2014) assign a large role to the evidence of 
one’s own experiences (including religious ones) and to the beliefs of one’s religious tradition, over 
and above the evidence of intersubjective arguments; this will tend to allow religious beliefs to 
remain justified even given the counterevidence supplied by disagreeing interlocutors. On the other 
hand, the evidentialisms of Schellenberg (2007, 190), McKim (2001, chapter 10), and Philipse (2014, 
part I) assign greater weight to intersubjective evidence (including the opposing viewpoints of 
disagreeing interlocutors), which may make positive epistemic status for religious beliefs more 
elusive. So it is not McKim’s endorsement of the epistemic-potential claim that yields his pessimism 
about the epistemic justification of religious beliefs; it is the strict form of evidentialism that he 
endorses alongside it. The epistemic-potential claim by itself entails no position on epistemic 
justification or status more broadly. It does not matter for my purposes which epistemic norms 
committed believers abide by, as long as those norms acknowledge the epistemic goods outlined 
above. 
 The second worry is that engaging in disagreement may psychologically undermine the believer’s 
commitment to her belief system, by shaking her confidence (Plantinga, 2000b, 189). In response, 
we must acknowledge that disagreement can pose psychological and therefore (assuming that one’s 
belief system is accurate) epistemic risks. But I contend that discouraging it is riskier still. First, 
foregoing disagreement forfeits you the benefits that it can bring (see above). Second, discouraging 
it may court the suspicion that the religious belief system that you are protecting would not hold up 
to outside scrutiny – and this is a greater, if more subtle, psychological threat to epistemic 
commitment than the sanguine encouraging of disagreement would be. Third, discouraging 
disagreement can create the impression that acceptance and approval in your community are linked 
to epistemic conformity. This might prompt some to remain epistemically committed in spite of 
nagging doubts – but such commitment is unhealthy, maintained for fear of rejection rather than 
for good epistemic reasons. And unhealthy commitment is epistemically dangerous: such believers 
risk forming a warped view on which God values strict doxastic obedience more than understanding 
powered by freedom. Hence discouraging disagreement runs epistemic risks of its own. I contend 
that the risks of engaging with disagreement are smaller, and the epistemic rewards greater, than 
those of eschewing it. 
One might object, from the other direction, that I am conceding way too much to committed 
religious believers. Am I not letting them uncritically ring-fence as much of their belief system as 
they please, and does this not contravene the whole point of engaging in disagreement? My first 
response is that nothing about my approach prevents people from changing their religious belief 
system, even drastically, should an earnest dialogue lead them to regard this as the epistemically 
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and personally best course. Second, commitment to a belief system, as I have said, is compatible 
with critical engagement with many of its components. Third, insisting (like McKim, 2001, 142) that 
you should be prepared to abandon your religious belief system is epistemically counterproductive: 
it will put off committed religious believers from engaging in any disagreement, thus forfeiting them 
any of its benefits. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Religious disagreement can seem threatening to religious believers intent on maintaining their 
epistemic commitment. But I have argued that it can promote the improvement of religious belief 
systems by delivering outside criticism, additional evidence, epistemic alternatives, and 
counterinstances to one’s biases. Far from being otiose or distracting when your religious belief 
system is largely accurate already, religious disagreement can help safeguard it against inaccuracy 
and promote new insights. It can do this even if your religious belief system arises from properly 
functioning religious-cognitive faculties, and it does so without threatening your epistemic 
justification. I have acknowledged that engaging in religious disagreement may pose psychological 
risks to committed believers, but have argued that the risks of discouraging or foregoing religious 
disagreement are greater.  
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beliefs to be merely ‘tentative’. 
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